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ions cannot be found outside the home. In light of the fact that few people
object, and that most inspections are made in blighted areas where probable
cause could be found, 58 it is doubtful that this result will destroy the effectiveness and efficiency of health and welfare inspection programs.5 9
The right to privacy has been described by Justice Brandeis as "the right
to be let alone- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."0 0 But the critical question is whether the right to privacy, encompassing within it the privilege to deny entry to any governmental official
without a warrant, is a right or "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' 61 The Frank
and Eaton decisions held that it was not such a principle and therefore not
incorporated within the fourteenth amendment. However, recent decisions of
the Supreme Court incorporating sections of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, 62 combined with the Court's willingness "to re-examine past
decisions according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the
preservation of basic liberties than that which was contemplated by its
Framers . . .,"63 indicates that the Frank decision may not withstand another
constitutional challenge.
GEORGE WALLACH

INSURANCE LAW-NoN-EsCAPING FmE HELD To CONSTITUTE HosTILE FIRE

When the automatic temperature control device of plaintiff's gas fired annealing furnace inexplicably failed to operate, the furnace became "almost white
hot" so that furnace and forgings therein were totally ruined. Plaintiff, a manufacturer of hand tools, claimed recovery under a standard New York fire insurance policy which covered all direct loss by fire.' On submission of the controversy on an agreed statement of facts, 2 held, for plaintiff. In view of modern
heating devices and equipment, when an uncontrolled fire produces excessive heat
causing damage, it is a hostile fire and within the coverage of the policy even
58. Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1115 (1956).
59. Supra note 58, at 1125. But see Guandolo, Housing Codes in Urban Renewal,
25 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1956).
60. Ohnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
61. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), quoting in part, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
62. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
63. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
1. N.Y. Ins. Law § 168.
2. N.Y. CPLR R. 3222.
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though the fire did not escape from its container. Barcalo Manufacturing Co. v.
Firemen's Mutual Insurance Co., 24 A.D.2d 55, 263 N.Y.S.2d 807 (4th Dep't
1965).
Although the standard fire insurance policy in terms covers "all direct loss
by fire," courts seldom give effect to the literal meaning of these words. 3 A
successful plaintiff must not only show the existence of a fire in the ordinary
sense of combustion accompanied by some light or glow,4 but also must prove a
"hostile" fire as distinguished from a "friendly" fire. 5 A friendly fire is generally
defined as a fire intentionally lighted and contained in the usual place for the
fire, such as a furnace, stove, or incinerator; and used for the purposes of heat-6
ing, cooking, manufacturing, or other common and usual everyday purposes.
On the other hand, a hostile fire is a fire "unexpected, unintended, not anticipated, in a place not intended for it to be and where fire is not ordinarily maintained. . .. ,,7A fire, originally friendly, may "escape" and thereby become
hostile.8 The friendly fire doctrine has been called the "container rule" since
courts look to the origin and locus of the burning in determining whether or not
fire has escaped. Courts will usually require an external secondary ignition' 0
although some courts have found a hostile fire where flame escaped through a
crack in an oven" or where hot coals were thrown out of a furnace by an explosion. 12 Where damage is caused both by a friendly and a hostile fire, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the portion of damage caused by the hostile fire. 13
The insurer will be liable for all the proximate results beyond ignition of a
3. Courts have assumed the necessity of judicial construction of the phrase, presumably, on the theory that public expectations of coverage do not include every direct loss
by fire. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Naman, 118 Tex. 21, 6 S.W.2d 743 (1928); Way v. Abington
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 43 N.E. 1032 (1896).
4. Western Woolen Mill Co. v. Northern Assur. Co., 139 Fed. 637 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 199 U.S. 608 (1905).
5. Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 43 N.E. 1032 (1896). It
should be further noted that plaintiff's ordinary negligence is not a bar while gross negligence
or recklessness may foreclose recovery. See Todd v. Traders' & Mechanics' Ins. Co., 230
Mass. 595, 120 N.E. 142 (1918). In New York the standard policy expressly provides that
the company is not liable for damages caused by "neglect .. . to use all reasonable means
to save and preserve property after loss or when the property is endangered by fire in
neighboring premises." N.Y. Ins. Law § 168.
6. 10 Couch, Insurance, § 42:3 (2d ed. 1962).
7. 29A Am. Jur. Insurance, § 1287 (1960).
8. E.g., Pappadakis v. Netherlands Fire & Life Ins. Co., 137 Wash. 430, 242 Pac. 641,
49 A.L.R. 402 (1926) (fire escaped through crack in oven and heated automatic sprinkler
control).
9. Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law 246-47 (2d ed. 1957).
10. Sigourney Produce Co. v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 211 Iowa 1203, 235
N.W. 284 (1931) (no secondary ignition); Coryell v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 118 Neb.
312, 229 N.W. 326, 68 A.L.R. 222 (1930) (secondary ignition); Solomon v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 53 R.I. 154, 165 AtI. 214 (1933) (no secondary ignition).
11. Pappadakis v. Netherlands Fire & Life Ins. Co., 137 Wash. 430, 242 Pac. 641, 49
A.L.R. 402 (1926). See Annot., 49 A.L.R. 406.
12. Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 218 Mo. App. 31, 260 S.W. 490 (1924).
13. Mutual Fire Ins. Agency v. Slater & Gilroy, Inc., 265 S.W. 2d 788 (Ky. 1954);
Progress Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Reciprocal Exchange, 109 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
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hostile fire such as heat, 14 smoke, 15 theft,'0 water' 7 and building collapse.' 8 But
similar damage, if caused by merely excessive fire, will not be covered if the fire
remained within its container.' 9
In most jurisdictions, claims for smoke and/or heat damage caused by "nonescaping" fires have been judicially denied in cases where a vent was left closed
in an exhaust flue,2 0 where a wick oil lamp was turned too high,21 and where a
pipe connecting a stove became disengaged at an upper floor.22 In cases involving
furnaces or stoves, recovery for smoke and soot damage was denied when a confined fire burned excessively 23 even though in addition, the fire was seen for a
short time outside the agency used to contain it.24 However, one early case allowed recovery when plaintiff's servant used an unsuitable burning material in a
furnace causing a furious fire to develop in a few moments, thus filling the house
with volumes of smoke and excess heat.25 The court held that a fire may be
hostile when it is "extraordinary and unusual, unsuitable for the purpose intended, and in a measure uncontrollable, besides being inherently dangerous
because of the unsuitable material used."12 6 Suits for damage to the heating
instrument itself have not usually been upheld. Thus, when the water supply in a
boiler became insufficient due to some mismanagement or mechanical accident
so that fire operating normally caused cracking and overheating, the insured
14. Austin v. Drew, 4 Campb. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115, Holt 126, 171 Eng. Rep.
187 (C.P. 1815); 6 Taunt. 436, 128 Eng. Rep. 1104, 2 Marsh 130 (C.P. 1816) (dictum);
Case v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 Ill.
676 (1852) (damage by beat caused by fire in
adjoining building).
15. E.g., Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 43 N.E. 1032 (1896).
(soot ignited in chimney).
16. E.g., Newmark v. Liverpool & London Fire & Life Ins. Co., 30 Mo. 160, 77
Am. Dec. 608 (1860).
17. Cummings v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 153 Iowa 579, 134 N.W. 79 (1912)
(damage caused by water used to extinguish fire).
18. Western Assur. Co. v. Hann, 201 Ala. 376, 78 So. 232 (1917) (plaintiff recovered
although fire-ravaged wall stood four months before falling).
19. E.g., Lavitt v. Hartford County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 At. 572
(1927) (smoke and soot damage caused by excessive fire in a home furnace held not
recoverable) ; see Vance, Friendly Fires, 1 Conn. Bar J. 284 (1927).
20. Austin v. Drew, 4 Campb. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115, Holt 126, 171 Eng. Rep. 187
(C.P. 1815); 6 Taunt. 436, 128 Eng. Rep. 1104, 2 Marsh 130 (C.P. 1816).
21. Fitzgerald v. German-American Ins. Co., 30 Misc. 72, 62 N.Y. Supp. 824 (Oneida
County Ct. 1899); Samuels v. Continental Ins. Co., 2 Pa. Dist. 379 (1892); See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 219 Ala. 208, 122 So. 23 (1929) (oil heater in kitchen became
allaflame, recovery allowed); Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Nelson, 90 Colo. 524, 10 P.2d 943
(1932) (electric range set at "high" burned food, recovery allowed); Hansen v. Le Mars Mut.
Ins. Ass'n, 193 Iowa 1, 186 N.W. 468, 20 A.L.R. 964 (1922) (burner set too high under
kitchen boiler used to heat wash water, no recovery); Sigourney Produce Co. v. Milwaukee
Mechanics' Ins. Co., 211 Iowa 1203, 235 N.W. 284 (1931) (wick turned too high on stove
used to heat eggs stored in room, no recovery) ; Collins v. Delaware Ins. Co., 9 Pa. Super.
576 (1899) (oil supplied to stove caught fire in feeding tank, recovery allowed).
22. Cannon v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 110 Ga. 563, 35 S.E. 775 (1900).
23. Lavitt v. Hartford County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 AUt. 572
(1927).
24. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. C. C. Anderson Co., 47 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Idaho 1942);
Solomon v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 53 R.I. 154, 165 At. 214 (1933).
25. O'Connor v. Queens Ins. Co. of America, 140 Wis. 388, 122 N.W. 1038 (1909).
26. Id. at 395, 122 N.W. at 1041.
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was not liable. 27 Recovery was similarly denied in a case where a stove operating
on "high" in a restaurant inexplicably became overheated, causing interior
metal plates to buckle and other damage to foodstuffs on a nearby shelf. 28 On
facts like those of the instant case, but in the context of a private home, a safety
shutoff controlling a fire in a furnace failed to operate. Plaintiff could not recover
for certain portions of his furnace which had become overheated and fused, nor
for the ornamental outside surface which had shrivelled and flaked.2 However,
prior to the instant case, two recent Minnesota cases granted recovery where an
excessive and uncontrolled flame resulted, iespectively, in the loss of a commercial baking oven30 and a furnace used to heat a building.3' Although, in both
cases, the court noted the presence of outside burning,32 it clearly indicated that
the excessive nature of the fire was an essential element which can make a con38
fined fire hostile.
In New York, the distinction between hostile and friendly first has long
been recognized.34 More recently, fires have been found to be friendly where
jewelry was cached in a fireplace and inadvertently burned, 35 or where a fire
36
causing smoke damage was seen only briefly outside the furnace. On the other

hand, recovery for smoke damage was allowed when a gas flame heater used in
27. McGraw v. Home Ins. Co., 93 Kan. 482, 144 Pac. 821 (1914); Wasserman v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 326 Mass. 518, 95 N.E.2d 547 (1950); Similarly, plaintiff could
not recover when his boiler was drained for repairs and a thermostat was left on, thereby
starting a fire which damaged boiler. Mitchell v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co. of America, 150
Pa. Super. 531, 28 A.2d 803 (1942). However, if the fire spread into another compartment
of the furnace where it was not intended to burn, recovery for damage to furnace has been
upheld. Frings v. Farm Bureau Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 99 Ohio App. 293, 133 N.E.2d 407 (1955);"
Progress Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Reciprocal Exchange, 109 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937). In an early case, recovery was denied for damage to a ship boiler caused by a fire in
the course of escaping. American Towing Co. v. German Fire Ins. Co., 74 Md. 25, 21 At.
553 (1891).
28. Consoli v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 97 N.H. 224, 84 A.2d 926 (1951); see also
First Christian Church v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Tenn. App. 482, 276 S.W.2d 502 (1954)
(coal generated too much heat under boiler).
29. Spare v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 137 Conn. 105, 75 A.2d 64 (1950); Note, 32
Ore. L. Rev. 69 (1952).
30. L. L. Freeberg Pie Co. v. St. Paul Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Minn. 249, 100 N.W.2d
753 (1960); Note, Hostility Toward the 'Hostile Fire' Doctrine, 6 S.D.L. Rev. 129 (1961).
31. Fiorito v. California Ins. Co., 262 Minn. 340, 114 N.W.2d 661 (1962).
32. In Freeberg, the court noted that thirty square feet of floor owned by plaintiff's
landlord charred and burned, 257 Minn. at 249, 100 N.W.2d at 753. In Fiorito, a cardboard box burned on top of the furnace, but plaintiff did not claim damage for this
item, 262 Minn. at 344, 114 N.W.2d at 664.
33. Fiorito v. California Ins. Co., 262 Minn. 340, 344, 114 N.W.2d 661, 664 (1962);
L. L. Freeberg Pie Co. v. St. Paul Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Minn. 249, 253, 100 N.W.2d 753, 755
(1960).
34. Briggs v. North American and Mercantile Ins. Co., 53 N.Y. 446 (1873) (explosion of gases by wick lamp not covered by policy which excepted explosions); Fitzgerald
v. German-American Ins. Co., 30 Misc. 72, 62 N.Y. Supp. 824 (Oneida County Ct. 1899)
(no recovery for smoke from faulty oil-burning lamp left lighted in plaintiff's office).
35. Wiener v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 124 Misc. 153, 207 N.Y. Supp. 279
(App. T. 1st Dep't 1924), aff'd, 214 App. Div. 784, 210 N.Y. Supp. 935 (1st Dep't 1925).
36. Davis v. Law Union & Rock Ins. Co., 166 Misc. 75, 1 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Munic. Ct.
N.Y.C. 1937), aff'd, 194 Misc. 176, 88 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. T.2d Dep't 1938). The lower
court stated, "The flame out of the chimney was an extension of the flame in the furnace,"
166 Misc. at 76, 1 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
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the processing of furs, was left on all night allegedly causing kindling of a
workbench.3 7 A jury verdict for plaintiff was set aside by the trial judge who
found the testimony as to the existence of the outside fire "incredible."38 The
Appellate Term reinstated the verdict, holding the jury finding not to be against
the weight of credible evidence. 39 While no Court of Appeals case has adopted
the container rule, it would appear that the test has been applied by the lower
appellate courts. The fact situation in Barcolo,40 where the plaintiff-manufacturer recovered, on an excessive fire theory, for damages to his commercial
furnace caused by a confined fire, is one of first impression.
Recognizing the necessity of judicially defining the word "fire" in the absence of definition in the standard fire policy itself, the court, in the instant
case, noted the widespread adoption of the "somewhat unsatisfactory distinction
between a 'hostile' fire and a 'friendly fire.' -41 The court pointed out the strong
judicial reliance on the authority of Austin v. Drew42 in drawing the distinction.
Since the rationale in the Drew case, as variously reported, was ambiguous the
court viewed the question as open and seemingly embraced the interpretation
of Professor Vance in his article "Friendly Fires.14 3 Professor Vance there argued
that Austin v. Drew established three elements in defining fires not covered by
fire policies. Quoting Vance, the court cited the three elements-intentional
kindling, burning in a designated place, and non-excessive burning. The court
observed that while there are "several jurisdictions" holding that "although a
fire contained in a furnace becomes excessively hot due to the malfunctioning
of a thermostat or other cause, it continues to be a friendly fire," there was an
"absence of controlling authority" in New York.44 The court, therefore, saw
itself free to follow the principles expressed in Wisconsin 45 and in recent Minnesota cases. 46 The holding adopted by the court relied heavily on an ambiguous
statement in the Fiorito47 case that in light of "the nature of present-day heating
devices and equipment ....

an excessive or uncontrolled fire, sufficient to melt

37. Redder v. British American Assur. Co., 197 Misc. 409, 95 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App.
T.lst Dep't), reversing 194 Misc. 108, 85 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.C. 1949). Note the
dictum in the lower court, 194 Misc. 110, 85 N.Y.S.2d 186, to the effect that fire which
does not operate in the manner intended or on the contrary destroys the vessel in
which it is intended to burn is still a friendly fire. For another container rule case allowing
recovery for damage caused by secondary ignition, see Giambalvo v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 178
Misc. 887, 36 N.Y.S.2d 598 (City Ct., N.Y.C. 1942) (leakage of oil which ignited outside
burner).
38. Reckler v. British American Assur. Co., 194 Misc. 108, 111, 85 N.Y.S.2d 183, 186
(Munic. Ct. N.Y.C. 1949).
39. Redder v. British American Assur. Co., 197 Misc. 409, 410, 95 N.Y.S.2d 822, 823
(App. T.lst Dep't 1949).
40. Instant case at 56, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
41. Instant case at 56, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
42. 4 Campb. 360, 171 Eng. Rep. 115, Holt 126, 171 Eng. Rep. 187 (C.P. 1815); 6
Taunt. 436, 128 Eng. Rep. 1104, 2 Marsh 130 (C.P. 1816).

43. Op. cit. supra note 19.
44.
45.
46.
berg Pie
47.

Instant case at 57, 58, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 809, 810.
O'Connor v. Queens Ins. Co. of America, 140 Wis. 388, 122 N.W. 1038 (1909).
Fiorito v. California Ins. Co., 262 Minn. 340, 114 N.W.2d 661 (1962); L. L. FreeCo. v. St. Paul Mut. Ins. Co., 257 Minn. 249, 100 N.W.2d 753 (1960).
Fiorito v. California Ins. Co., supra note 46.
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parts of a furnace, surely is included in the intended meaning of the words 'loss
or damage by fire.' "48 Thus the court recognized that container fire damage in
a modern industrial context required bringing the rule into harmony with the
expectation of the insured.
In attempting to avoid the harshness of the container theory by ruling that
the fire within a container may be nevertheless hostile, the Fourth Department
joins but two other jurisdictions.49 While the court's liberal approach in questioning an old and illogical rule may be commended, it is not clear from the
opinion how far the present decision will reach. The material facts stressed in
the opinion were that an unspecified automatic temperature control failed to
operate and the furnace and forgings within were destroyed by excessive heat.
Since the court did not specify if the faulty temperature control operated directly on the fire, 50 it may be that the insurer will be liable whenever fireproduced heat is improperly regulated by a mechanical device, even if the fire
itself operates at its normal intensity.51 Nor is it clear how the court would
limit the excessive fire test. It would seem that the rule, in its rigidity, would
apply to every case where heat at a higher level than desired caused damage.
An attempt to limit the test by measuring the extent of damage would not be
satisfactory since recovery would thus ultimately depend on an arbitrary drawing of a line.
48. Id. at 344, 114 N.W.2d at 664 (1962). The ambiguity arises in the court's phrase
"excessive or uncontrolled" (emphasis added). Is an excessive fire if controlled sufficient
to constitute a hostile fire when, for example, a worker accidentally applies a welding
torch too long causing damage or a baker overbakes bread? Or, can a fire be hostile if
uncontrolled but not excessive when, for example, a thermostat regulates a flame at too
low a temperature spoiling goods?
49. The court follows Minnesota and Wisconsin. One lower appellate court has
refused to recognize the traditional distinction between friendly and hostile fires. Salmon
v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 161 So. 340 (La. App. 1935) (plaintiff recovered
for bracelet inadvertently placed in trash burner); Note, 21 Cornell L.Q. 318 (1936);
Note, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 485 (1936).
50. According to the stipulation of facts made on submission of the controversy,
Barcolo's temperature control worked as follows: A valve supplying gas to the furnace was
opened to maximum in order to reach the annealing temperature quickly. Once the
desired temperature was reached, an automatic control limited the supply of gas to keep
a steady temperature. A separate timing device stopped the supply of gas completely
one hour after the annealing temperature had been reached. Apparently, in the present
case, the supply of gas was not properly reduced, and the temperature continued to build
thus destroying the timing device.
51. The opinion in the instant case criticizes several decisions applying the majority
rule. In one case, a thermonstat, working properly, started and regulated a fire but caused
damage because plaintiff negligently failed to turn the control off after he had drained his
boiler for repairs. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument as to lack of intent to
set a fire on the ground that the existence of automatic controls made the question of intent
irrelevant, and that, in any case, the fire was confined to the furnace and was, therefore,
a friendly fire. The opinion stated that "the principle properly deducible from the cases
is that if the fire is confined wholly within the furnace, stove, heater, etc., which was
installed wholly for the purpose of having a fire within it, loss or damage to the heating
appliance by overheating, lack of water or other improper handling is not covered by the
policy" Mitchell v. Globe & Republic Ins. Co. of America, 150 Pa. Super 531, 535, 28 A.2d
803, 804 (1942). Query, whether the failure in Barcolo to distinguish the Mitchell fact situation means that recovery will be allowed when, for example, negligent handling or mechnical
failure results in maintenance of insufficient supply of water in a boiler causing overheating and cracking?
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A more fundamental objection cutting across the instant case goes to the

assumptions underlying traditional analyses of the words "loss by fire" in a fire
insurance policy. Definitions of hostile fire in terms of locus, control, or excessiveness are concerned primarily with the kind of fire implied in the phrase "loss by
fire" in the standard policy. The meaning of the phrase taken as a whole is not

given effect although it truly expresses the expectation of the insured.52 It is
submitted that what is meant by the phrase and what, in fact, is insured against
is accidental loss by any type of fire, not merely losses resulting from accidental
fires. The difference in approach is that the latter looks to the flame as if the
accidental kind of fire (e.g., outside, excessive) will always reveal whether the
loss was intended to be covered. 3 This emphasis leads to anomalous results

when the damage involving the heat and smoke effects of fire is essentially the
same. 54 If extensive smoke damage accidentally produced by any fire was as-

sumed to be covered it is no answer that the insured could have bought a smoke
endorsement. The insured may not be aware of the need unless brought to his

attention. But broad smoke and heat coverage is of increasing importance
in view of the extensive use of automatic mechanisms to control the effects of
fire utilized in manufacturing situations. As automation proceeds, it may be

predicted that courts will have to deal more and more with the effects of nonescaping fires.
The shortcomings of inquiries into the kind of fire insured against are
especially evident in a case where, hypothetically, valuables accidently fall into a

fireplace5 5 or where, as actually occurred, valuables are mistakenly placed in a
trash burner and later burned.5 6 Surely here the insured expects such loss to be

covered when accidently caused by ignition. Since the distinction between a
hostile and friendly fire is based upon an illogical analysis of expected coverage,
52. Since the terms of the standard fire insurance policy are not "bargained for,"
the typical contract test of intention of the parties is not appropriate. Instead, courts will
usually look to the expectations of the parties. See Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918); but in a more recent case, Mode Ltd., v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 62 Idaho 270, 110 P.2d 840, 133 A.L.R. 791 (1941), the court said that the distinction between hostile and friendly fire was of such long standing that the parties were
presumed to have it in mind.
53. See Abbot, The Meaning of Fire in an Insurance Policy Against Loss or Damage
by Fire, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 119 (1910).
54. Suppose, for example, an uncontrolled excessive fire which remains confined
causes extensive internal heat damage. Barcolo would allow recovery. However, if the
same fire-produced heat damage occurs by failure of an automatic heat vent to open
properly, any analysis of the character of the fire will foreclose liability. Again, if an
automatic regulator improperly enriched the fuel mixture of a fire causing smoke damage,
what is the difference to the insured, in terms of kind of damage contemplated, that
the damage was caused by, e.g., a disengaged exhaust pipe?
55. While no American case has held on these facts, in France, recovery was granted in
Countess Fitz-James v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 23 Ir. L. T. & Sol. J. 169 (1889). The terms
friendly fire and hostile fire were not used in the case.
56. E.g., Youse v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 172 Kan. 111, 238 P.2d 472 (1951); Note,
30 N.C.L. Rev. 431 (1952) (majority rule); but see Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co.
of Milwaukee, 161 So. 340 (La. App. 1935); Harris v. Poland, E1941] 1 K.B. 462. For
discussion, inter alia, of the Harris case, see Note, Hostile and Friendly Fires in Canadian
Insurance Law, 2 U.B.C. Legal Notes 373 (1956).
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one can only conclude that it should be judicially discarded. 57 The rule suggested
here, permitting recovery for all proximate accidental loss by fire, would seem
an appropriate rule of construction for judicial adoption. Of course the touchstone will always be the expectations of the parties, and that may vary in view
of the kind of property insured or the nature of the business. 58
ROBERT M. KoRNEIcH

57. Administrative regulations or legislation overruling the "container" decisions may
be helpful in altering the judicial approach in interpreting the standard fire policy, but
it cannot assure proper judicial construction in terms of the expectations of parties in
particular fact situations.
58. It has been suggested that "irregularities in the process of production" may be
reflected in price as part of the cost of production and, hence, not part of the expected
coverage. For example, a baker who overbakes bread must have known that an occasional
batch would be lost. See Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal
Devices, 24 Colum. L. Rev. 335, 338 (1924).

